University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 32
Issue 1 Fall 2002

Article 3

2002

Sleeping with the Enemy? The IRS' Advanced
Notice of Rulemaking Regarding Capitalization
Cheyanna L. Jaffke
Western State College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Tax Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jaffke, Cheyanna L. (2002) "Sleeping with the Enemy? The IRS' Advanced Notice of Rulemaking Regarding Capitalization," University
of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 32: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol32/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

SLEEPING WITH THE ENEMY? THE IRS'
ADVANCED NOTICE OF RULEMAKING
REGARDING CAPITALIZATION
By CheyaIina L. Jaffket
INTRODUCTION

1.

Imagine being lost in a maze where the instructions to the exit are
written in a way that is subject to many interpretations. Along the way,
you stop and ask people for some direction in interpreting the instructions. You find that there are as many different interpretations as
there are people to ask. You want to exit the maze but a wrong turn
could be dangerous or costly. Once you reach what seems to be the
exit, you feel a sense of relief. But, the next time you enter the maze,
you find that it has changed. You have difficulty finding the exit
again. Past experience in the maze does not help you. You find that
you are once again lost, and so you start all over again.
This is the situation that many taxpayers face when determining if
something is an expenditure that must be capitalized or an expense
that is currently deductible. The tax code and regulations are vague
at best. On this issue, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued
inconsistent guidelines. The various courts have held that the same or
similar expenditures between different taxpayers are subject to different treatment. Even tax practitioners do not agree on when something should be capitalized or expensed.
In an effort to provide guidance, the IRS announced in an advanced notice of proposed rule making that it would promulgate regulations regarding the capitalization or deduction of various
expenditures. 1 The proposed regulations would address various issues, including a regulation that would permit taxpayers to immediately deduct "regular and recurring" expenses. 2 The impetus of the
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Fed. Reg. 3461 (proposed Jan. 24, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
2. Id. at 3462.
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proposed regulations originates from u.s. Freightways v. Commissioner,3
where the seventh circuit chided the IRS for inconsistency regarding
the application of the capitalization rules. 4
The seminal case in the area of capitalization was INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Commissioner,5 decided by the Supreme Court in 1992. The IRS, the
courts, and taxpayers are still wrestling with the determination of
when an item should be deducted or capitalized. Unfortunately, no
bright line rule has emerged, and guidance is needed in this area of
confusion. IRS regulations, however, are not the proper means to
provide this guidance, especially in the area of a "regular and recurring rule." This rulemaking would be encroaching on the purview of
Congress.
A glance at the proposed regulations and the resulting taxpayers'
comments suggest that the proposal may be too taxpayer-friendly.
This raises the question of whether the new kinder, gentler IRS is too
kind and too gentle. Why is the IRS bowing to the influence of the
business industry and creating rules that favor taxpayers?
Generally, regulations are seen as interpreting the intent of Congress in relationship to a particular code section. However, any proposed regulation that creates an exception for a "regular and
recurring rule" would be creating new law, not interpreting the old
law. 6 The IRS lacks the authority to issue regulations that create new
law. Therefore, the IRS and taxpayers should seek the necessary guidance from the body that is empowered to provide it, Congress.
Part II of this article provides a general background related to the
issue of deducting and capitalizing expenditures and will describe the
basic accounting principles that are necessary to fully comprehend
the consequences of the IRS' ill-advised efforts to provide guidance.
Part III illustrates why the IRS lacks the authority to issue these types
of regulations, and discusses the reason why this authority is properly
vested in Congress. Part IV explores the problems with a "regular and
recurring" exception to the capitalization rules. Finally, Part V of this
article concludes that Congress, and not the IRS, is the proper authority to offer desperately needed guidance in the area of capitalization
and deduction of expenditures.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Methods of Accounting

The Internal Revenue Code permits taxpayers to report their income based upon the method of accounting that they use to keep
3.
4.
5.
6.

270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1141-42.
503 U.S. 79 (1992).
See infra Part III.
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their books. 7 Additionally, the Code lists various methods of accounting that are acceptable. 8 The vast majority of taxpayers are either cash
method taxpayers or accrual method taxpayersY

1.

Cash Method of Accounting

The majority of individuals use the cash method of accounting. lO
Under the cash method of accounting, a taxpayer is required to report income "for the year that amounts are actually or constructively
received"ll and takes deductions when expenses are paid. 12 Cash
method taxpayers' money flow is closely tied to their reporting of income and deduction. 13 Income and expenses follow the money. Section 448 (a) (1) prohibits C-corporations l4 from using the cash method
of accounting. 15 Therefore, C-corporations tend to use the other
most common method of accounting, the accrual method. 16

2.

Accrual Method of Accounting

Under the accrual method of accounting, taxpayers report income
when the "all-events test" is met. 17 This test is satisfied when all-events
have occurred that fix the right to the income and the amount of the
income can be determined with reasonable accuracy.18 Accrual taxpayers are permitted to take deductions when the "all-events test" is
met and economic performance has occurred. 19 The Supreme Court
has emphasized that "a liability does not accrue as long as it remains
contingent."20 Therefore, in order to comply with the "all-events test,"
7. 26 U.S.C. § 446(a) (1984). All references to code sections are references to
the Internal Revenue Code codified in Title 26 of the United States Code.
How a taxpayer keeps his or her books refers to the method of financial
accounting the taxpayer uses.
8. 26 U.S.C. § 446(c) (1984).
9. See 3 ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT,
PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 15.03 (2d ed. 2002).
10. See 2 MERTENS, THE LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 12A:03 (2002).
11. [d.; see 26 U.S.C. § 451(a) (1998); also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 20 (7th ed.
1999).
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1 (a) (1) (1999).
13. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(l) (2002); MERTENS, supra note 10,
§ 12A:03.
14. See generally BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 341 (7th ed. 1999) (defining C corporation as "raJ corporation whose income is taxed through it rather than
through its shareholders").
15. 26 U.S.C.A. § 448(a) (1) (West 2002).
16. See MERTENS, supra note 10, § 12A:04.
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (c) (1) (ii)(A) (2001).
18. [d.
19. See id.
20. Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193,200 (1934); accord Dixie Pine Prods. Co.
v. Comm'r, 320 U.S. 516, 519 (1944).
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a liability must be "final and definite in amount,"21 "fixed and absolute,"22 and unconditiona1. 23
Economic performance 24 is a requirement that Congress created in
order to prohibit taxpayers from taking advantage of the time value of
money when taking deductions. 25 In essence, it was to prevent taxpayers from accelerating deductions by prepaying them. Generally,
under the accrual method a taxpayer's income and deductions do not
follow the money flOW. 26

B.

Deductions

Deductions are a matter of legislative grace. 27 Congress provided
these deductions in Parts VI, VII, and VIII of the Internal Revenue
Code, section 161 through section 249. 28 Section 161 states: "In computing taxable income ... there shall be allowed as deductions the
items specified in this part, subject to the exceptions provided in part
IX."29
Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code is the trade or business
deduction provision. It permits taxpayers to deduct from their gross
income those expenses that are "ordinary and necessary" and "paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business."3o
Therefore, in order for something to be currently deductible it
must be an expense. Otherwise, it is an expenditure. If an item is an
expenditure, it is covered by part IX, "Items Not Deductible," which
includes section 263Y Section 263 denies a deduction for those items
that fall within its purview. 32

2l.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

27.
28.
29.
30.
3l.
32.

Security Flour Mills Co. v. Comm'r, 321 U.S. 281, 287 (1944).
Brown, 291 U.S. at 20l.
Lucas v. N. Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11, 13 (1930).
For a more detailed explanation of economic performance see Part IV.C.l.
H.R. REp. No. 98-432 at 1254 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 697,
917.
See Baird v. Comm'r, 256 F.2d 918, 924 (7th Cir. 1958) (stating "an 'accrual
method' means that you report income when earned, even if not received,
and deduct expenses when incurred, even if not paid, within the taxable
period").
See INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84; Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm'r, 319 U.S.
590,593 (1943); Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
See 26 U.S.CA §§ 161-249 (West 2002).
26 U.S.C.A. § 16l.
26 U.S.C.A. § 162(a).
See 26 U.S.CA §§ 261-80.
See 26 U.S.CA § 263.
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Section 162

In order for a taxpayer to qualify for a deduction under section 162,
the item must meet five requirements. 33 The item must "(1) be 'paid
or incurred during the taxable year,' (2) be for 'carrying on any trade
or business,' (3) be an 'expense,' (4) be a 'necessary' expense, and
(5) be an 'ordinary' expense."34 Each item must be met independently in order to qualify for a deduction.
An item is ordinary if it is the kind of expense that is common in
the business community to which the taxpayer belongs. 35 An ordinary
expense is not necessarily one that the taxpayer must pay on a regular
basis. 36 Although, sometimes, of course, an ordinary item will be one
that the taxpayer regularly incurs. _
An item is necessary if it is helpful and appropriate to the particular
business of the taxpayer. 37 Generally a court will not substitute its
judgment for what is helpful and appropriate to the business, for that
of the taxpayer. 38
The requirement that an item must be paid or incurred in the carrying on of a business 39 generally presupposes an existing business. 4o
For example, expenses of investigating or creating a business would
not be paid or incurred while carrying on business. 41 Therefore,
these expenses would not be deductible under section 162.42 A taxpayer would have to look to other code provisions to recover the cost
of those expenditures, namely section 195. 43
The expense must be for a trade or business. 44 A trade or business
depends upon how the taxpayer engages in the activity.45 In order for
the activity to qualify as a trade or business, the taxpayer's activity must
be regular and continuous with the primary purpose of the activity
being profit or income. 46 Therefore, a taxpayer that holds herself out
to others as selling goods or services would be engaged in a trade or
business. 47
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See Comm'r v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971).
Id. (quoting from I.RD § 162(a) (1954)).
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113-15 (1933).
See id. at 114.
See id. at 113.
See id. at 115.
Frank v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 511, 513 (1953).
Id. at 513-14.
Id. at 513.
Seeid.at514.
Id.
See Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 27 (1987).
Id. at 29.
Id. at 30.
See id. at 31.
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By and large, the element often in question is whether or not the
item is an expense or an expenditure. In order to analyze the issue
one must seek guidance from section 263 and its regulations.
2.

Section 263

Section 263 is the starting point for determining if something is an
expenditure. The statute itself is of little assistance. It merely denies a
deduction for items that are "new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments."48 Turning to the regulations, the key
language describes an expenditure as "property having a useful life
substantially beyond the taxable year."49 If the taxpayer's payment
creates or enhances an asset that has a useful life substantially beyond
the tax year, then the taxpayer cannot currently deduct the payment. 50 The taxpayer must capitalize the payment, meaning that the
taxpayer will recover the cost via depreciation, amortization, or upon
sale. 51
The language of the regulation created the confusion that led to
the proposed regulations. Taxpayers, the IRS, and courts have been
wrestling with whether and when something is substantially beyond
the taxable year. The seminal case that attempted to answer these
questions was INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner. 52
C.

INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner

A taxpayer incurred investment banking, legal and other costs in
the course of a friendly takeover. 53 The taxpayer sought to immediately deduct these costs under section 162.54 The IRS argued that the
taxpayer must capitalize the expense under section 263. 55 The taxpayer made its arguments based on the Supreme Court's holding in
Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings and Loan Ass'n56 that expenses that
"create or enhance ... a separate and distinct additional asset" must
be capitalized. 57 The taxpayer argued that this created a test that limited when expenses must be capitalized. 58
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

26 U.S.C.A. § 263(a) (1) (West 1997).
26 C.F.R. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (2002).
Comm'r v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 361 (1971).
1 BORIS I. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND GIFTS § 20.4.1 (1981).
503 U.S. 79 (1992).
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 82 (1992) (holding that investment banking, legal, and other expenses incurred in friendly takeover did
not qualifY for a deduction as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses).
Id.
Id. at 83 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 263(a) (1) (1994)).
403 U.S. 345 (1971).
INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 83 (quoting Lincoln, 403 U.S. at 354).
Id. at 86.
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However, the Court noted that "deductions are exceptions to the
norm of capitalization."59 Therefore, deductions should be "strictly
construed," meaning that deductions would only be allowed if "there
is a clear provision therefore."6o The Court in INDOPCO limited Lincoln Savings to the proposition that "the creation of a separate and
distinct asset may well be a sufficient, but not a necessary condition to
classification as a capital expenditure."61 The Court proceeded to
state that the indicia of capitalization includes "a taxpayer's realization
of benefits beyond the year in which the expenditure is incurred [and
that it] is undeniably important in determining whether the appropriate tax treatment is [an] immediate deduction or capitalization."62
INDOPCO's guidance falls far short of a bright line rule on when an
asset should be capitalized; rather, it suggested an examination of the
potential incidental future benefit of the asset and the "amorphous"
nature of the asset itself. 63 The Court stated that "an incidental future
benefit-'some future aspect'-may not warrant capitalization."64
Courts, the IRS and taxpayers have been unable to reach a consensus
on what is meant by "an incidental future benefit."
D.

u.s.

Freightways v. Commissioner

This lack of consensus culminated in U.S. Freightways v. Commissioner. 65 The taxpayer, an accrual method calendar year C- corporation, incurred over $5 million for fees, licenses, insurance and permits
(FLIP expenses) in order to operate its fleet of trucks. 66 These expenses were for exactly one year, but because of various due dates,
some of the expenses carried over into the following calendar year. 67
According to the taxpayer's financial records, fifty-five percent of the
expenses were allocable to the following calendar year. 68
The taxpayer argued that it should be able to deduct the expenses
all in the year paid, rather than allocating the expenses among the
two years covered by the expenses. 69 The IRS argued that, because
the benefit of the expenses extended substantially beyond the close of
the tax year the taxpayer was required to capitalize the expenses. 70
59. Id. at 84.
60. !d. (quoting New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 u.s. 435, 440 (1934»;
see also Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940).
61. INDOPCO, 543 U.S. at 87.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 87, n.6.
64. Id. at 87 (emphasis in original).
65. 113 T.C. 329 (1999), rev'd 270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001).
66. See id. at 330-31.
67. Id.
68. U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F.3d 1137, 1139 (7th Cir. 2001).
69. See Freightways, 113 T.C. at 330-31.
70. Id. at 331.
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Because the taxpayer was an accrual method taxpayer, it could only
deduct the expenses if the "all-events test" was met and if economic
performance had occurred. 71 The "all-events test" requires that all
events have occurred, which establish liability and that the amount
can be determined with reasonable accuracy.72 There was no question in this case that the "all-events test" was met as to the FLIP
expenses. 73
Additionally, an accrual method taxpayer may not deduct the expense until economic performance has occurred. 74 According to the
regulations, economic performance for the FLIP expenses occurred
as the taxpayer paid the expenses. 75 Under a strict application of the
accrual method of accounting, the taxpayer would have been able to
deduct the FLIP expenses if the benefit of the payments was limited to
the tax year of the payment. 76
The IRS used section 446(b) to argue that the taxpayer's method of
accounting did not clearly reflect income for the FLIP expenses. 77
The IRS further argued that the proper method of accounting for
these expenses was to prorate the expenses between the two tax years
that were covered by the FLIP expenses. 78 The taxpayer already prorated the expenses in this way for financial accounting purposes. 79
In the tax court, the taxpayer argued that the "one-year rule" that
applies to cash method taxpayers should apply to accrual method taxpayers.80 The judicially created "one-year rule" permits cash method
taxpayers to deduct a prepayment of expenses in the year paid, so
long as the prepayment did not extend more than 12 months from
the end of the tax year of the payment. 81
The tax court recognized the distinction between cash method taxpayers and accrual method taxpayers, explaining that the application
of some rules would hinge on the method employed by individual taxpayers.82 In accord with precedent, the tax court limited the applica71. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (c)(l) (ii) (A)(2001).
72. See id.
73. See Freightways, 113 T.C. at 330 (stating that the company paid for licenses
necessary to conduct business).
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1 (c) (1) (ii) (A) (2002).
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(g)(5) & (6) (2002).
76. See Freightways, 270 F.3d at 1143 (discussing that the problem with the FLIP
expenses is not that they last longer than 365 days, but that they fall over
two tax years).
77. See Freightways, 113 T.C. at 337.
78. [d. at 331.
79. [d. at 330-31.
80. See id. at 335.
81. Zaninovich v. Comm'r, 616 F.2d 429,432 n.6 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'g, 69 T.C.
605 (1978).
82. Freightways, 113 T.e. at 336.
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tion of the "one-year rule" to cash method taxpayers, negating the
possibility of applying the rule to accrual method taxpayers. 83
On appeal, the seventh circuit reversed the holding of the tax
court. 84 First, the court of appeals examined the level of deference
afforded the Commissioner's interpretation of the term "substantially"
within the regulations. 85 The court of appeals decided that the Commissioner's interpretation warranted less deference than granted in
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council 86 because of the informality
of the Commissioner's interpretation. 87
Second, the court then examined the regulation that requires capitalization for benefits that extend substantially beyond the tax year,88
but only after noting that the language of the regulation was identical
for cash method taxpayers and accrual method taxpayers. 89 The court
opined that because of the identical language, the Commissioner's interpretation must be consistent between cash and accrual method taxpayers. 90 The court also noted that the Commissioner's
interpretation lacked consistency between accrual method taxpayers;
therefore, the court afforded the Commissioner's interpretation little
deference. 91
After turning its attention to the recurring nature of the FLIP expenses,92 the court held that the "one-year rule" also applies to accrual
method taxpayers. 93 It is unclear from the court's opinion, whether
the "one-year rule" would apply to accrual method taxpayers that do
not have recurring expenses.
E.

Advanced Notice Of Rulemaking

On January 24, 2002, the IRS issued an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking regarding the promulgation of regulations for section 263(a).94 The notice for the proposed section recognized that
the "fundamental purpose of section 263(a) is to prevent the distortion of taxable income through current deduction of expenditures re83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
9l.
92.
93.
94.

[d. at 337.
270 F.3d 1137 (7th Cir. 2001).
[d. at 1141-42.
467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that courts afford agency administrators deference when interpreting regulations where congressional intent is
unclear).
Freightways, 270 F.3d at 1142.
[d. at 1143-45.
[d. at 1143.
[d.
[d. at 1145.
Freightways, 270 F.3d at 1145-47.
[d. at 1147.
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67
Fed. Reg. 3461, 3462 (proposed Jan. 24, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R.

pt. 1).
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lating to the production of income in future taxable years."95 The
purpose of this proposed section is "[t]o reduce the administrative
and compliance costs associated with section 263(a)."96
The proposed regulations give certain havens to taxpayers including the "one-year rule" and "de minimis rules."97 Under the "one-year
rule," expenditures that relate "to intangible assets or benefits whose
lives are of a relatively short duration are not required to be capitalized."98 The "de minimis rules" would permit specific expenditures to
be deducted when they fall below a certain dollar amount. 99
The proposal also stated that the IRS would consider a "regular and
recurring rule," which would permit "costs incurred in transactions
that occur on a regular and recurring basis in the routine operation of
a taxpayer's trade or business" to be immediately deductible. lOo
Part III focuses on the "regular and recurring rule," and takes the
position that the IRS lacks the authority to issue regulations on this
topic. 10l It further argues that even if the IRS has the authority, Congress is in the best position to offer taxpayers guidance concerning
the "regular and recurring rule."102 Finally, Part IV argues that any
proposed regulation that offers a "regular and recurring rule" would
be inappropriate, because it conflicts with Congress' rule regarding
recurring items in section 461 (h)( 3) .
III.

THE IRS LACKS THE AUTHORIlYTO ISSUE REGULATIONS

Under the administrative law policies, agencies can promulgate two
types of regulations: legislative and interpretative. 103 The basic difference between these two regulations is how the regulations are promulgated. 104 Generally, legislative regulations comply with the
Administrative Procedures Act and are subject to public notice and
comment. 105 Interpretive regulations, on the contrary, are not re95. Id.
96. Id.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67
Fed. Reg. 3461, 3462 (proposed]an. 24, 2002)(to be codified at 26 C.F.R.
pt. 1).

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part I1I.C.
William G. Andreozzi, Prohibiting the Deduction for Non-Corporate Tax Deficiency Interest: When Treasury Goes Too Far, 34 J. MARsHALL L. REv. 557, 576
(2001); see also Elizabeth Williams, What Constitutes ''Interpretative Rule" of
Agency so as to Exempt Such Action From Notice Requirements of Administrative
Procedure Act (5 U.S.G.S. § 553(b)(3)(A)), 126 A.L.R. FED. 347 (1995).
104. Naftali Z. Dembitzer, Beyond the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998:
Perceived Abuses of the Treasury Department's Rulemaking Authority, 52 TAX LAw.
501,503 (Spring 1999).
105. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 553(b)-(c) (West 1996); see also CHARLES H. KOCH,]R., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PRACTICE § 4.11[2] (2d ed. 1997).
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quired under the Administrative Procedures Act to be subject to public notice and comment. 106 Because legislative and interpretive
regulations have different authorization requirements, the procedural
steps needed to promulgate the regulations vary. 107

A.

Tax Regulations

However, in the tax arena, the two different regulations are not
based upon how they are promulgated. lOS Almost all of the treasury
regulations that address a tax issue have been subject to public notice
and comment in compliance with the Administrative Procedures
Act. 10g The difference between the two types of regulations is generally the authority under which the Secretary promulgates the
regulations. 1 10
1.

Legislative

Legislative regulations are those regulations in which Congress has
expressly granted the Secretary authority to promulgate regulations
for a particular code section,ul It is generally viewed that legislative
regulations are the result of an incomplete code section in which Congress envisions the Secretary and his agent, the Commissioner, completing the code section with regulationsY2 For example, in section
1 (g) (7)( C), Congress grants the Secretary specific authority to "prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry
out the purposes of this paragraph. "11 3 Therefore, any regulations issued by the Secretary that deal with the election to claim certain
unearned income of a child on the parent's return would be legislative regulations. 1 14

2.

Interpretive

Interpretive regulations are those regulations that the Secretary issues pursuant to the authority granted to him under section 7805. 115
106. 5 U.S.CA § 553(b) (3) (A) (West 1996).
107. See KOCH, supra note 105, at § 4.11 [3].
108. Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FlA. TAX
REv. 51, 56 (1996).
109. ld. at 57.
110. Id. at 56-57.
111. Id. at 56.
112. See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984);
see also John F. Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 35, 69-70 (1995); Jason T.
Bell, Comment, Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. United States: Using a Balanced
Approach to Review a Treasury Regulation Issued Pursuant to the Commissioner's
General Authority, 34 NEW ENG. L. REv. 449, 454 (2000).
113. 26 U.S.CA § 1(g)(7)(C) (West 2001).
114. See id.; see also Aprill, supra note 108, at 56-57.
115. 26 U.S.CA § 7805(a) (West 1989)(stating "the Secretary shall prescribe all
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title, mcluding all
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When Congress does not grant specific authority to enact regulations
to enforce a particular code section, then the code section is viewed as
complete. 1l6 Any regulations would serve only to interpret the law as
given by Congress. 117 Most tax regulations are interpretive
regulations.

B.

The Proposed Regulations

In its advanced notice of proposed rulemaking, the IRS cites section
263 as the code section for which the proposed regulations will be
issued. 118 An examination of section 263 reveals no specific authority
within the section for the Secretary to issue regulations to enforce the
code section.1l9 Therefore, the regulations would have to be promulgated under the authority of section 7805 and will be interpretive
regulations.
Because the regular and recurring rule will permit the immediate
expensing of trade or business expenses, an examination of section
162 is unwarranted. Section 162(h) (3) grants the Secretary authority
to prescribe regulations relating to the time and manner of an election that state legislatures can make regarding their expenses as state
legislatures. 120 Section 162 contains no other grants of specific
authority.
Because neither section 162 nor section 263 grants the Secretary
specific authority to prescribe these regulations, the proposed regulations would be interpretive regulations. However, the regulations will
be subject to the same public notice and comment as legislative
regulations.

c.

Why The IRS Lacks Authority

Section 7805 grants authority for necessary rules. 121 That is not to
say that rules and regulations are not needed in section 263 and the
determination of when an expenditure should be capitalized. However, that authority should be interpreted narrowly so that not any
regulation can be promulgated under the auspices of a particular
code section, when that regulation greatly exceeds or contradicts the
intent of Congress.

116.
117.
lIS.
119.
120.
121.

rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of any alteration of law
in relation to internal revenue"); see also Aprill, supra note lOS, at 56.
Coverdale, supra note 112, at 70; see also Bell, supra note 112, at 454.
See Coverdale, supra note 112, at 69-70.
Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67
Fed. Reg. 3461,3462 (proposed Jan. 24, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R.
pt. 1).
26 U.S.CA § 263 (West 1997).
26 U.S.CA § 162(h)(3) (West 2000).
26 U.S.CA § 7S05(a) (West 1995).
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The Supreme Court has stated that the Secretary cannot use his
rulemaking authority to create new law. 122 A "regular and recurring"
rule would be just that, a new law. It would fit under the auspices of
an exception to the norm of capitalization. In other words, something that should be capitalized absent the rule will now be deductible
if it is a regular and recurring item in the taxpayer's business. It has
been repeatedly recognized that capitalization is the norm and that
deductions need to be narrowly construed. 123 In effect, although the
regulation would appear to be an exception to the capitalization
norm, it would, in fact, act as a deduction.
Section 263(a) disallows deductions for capital expenditures. 124
Therefore, a taxpayer needs another code section allowing the deduction. 125 The taxpayer will turn to section 162. However, the regulation seems to add an additional intermittent aspect to the expense
element of section 162.126 It would create a new test for the expense
element of section 162. The taxpayer would ask first, is the item regular and recurring? If yes, then the expense element is met. The taxpayer would never get to section 263.
This contradicts Congress' intent of capitalization being the
norm. 127 Under section 162, Congress indicated, and the courts have
recognized, that an expense is a required element for deduction,
which requires an analysis of, and comparison with, section 263. 128
Congress enacted section 263 so that taxpayers would be forced to
analyze their expenses to properly match income with expenses. 129
However, a regular and recurring rule would permit taxpayers to side
step this necessary, but difficult examination. The result would be a
lack of matching of income and expenses, and the opportunity for
abuse. Taxpayers could pre-pay regular and recurring expenses that
would otherwise have to be capitalized in order to accelerate the tax
benefits.

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Morrill v. Jones, 106 U.S. 466, 467 (1883).
INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1991); see supra Part II.C.
26 U.S.CA § 263(a) (West 2002).
See 26 U.S.CA § 161 (West 2002).
See 26 U.S.CA § 162(a) (2000).
INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84; see Alan Gunn, The Requirement that a Capitall!-xpenditure Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COMMERCIAL L. REv.
443 (1974);John W. Lee & Nina R. Murphy, Capital Expenditures: A Result in
Search ofa Rationale, 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 473 (1981).
128. Comm'r v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 352 (1971) (quoting
I.R.C. § 162(a)); see al50 John Lee et aI., Restating Capitalization Standards and
Rules: The Case for Rough Justice Regulations (Part One), 23 OHIO N. U. L. REv.
631,633 (1997).
129. See Comm'r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1974); see also Peter L.
Faber, INDOPCO: The Still Unsolved Riddle, 47 TAX LAw. 607, 612 (1994).
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Because the proposed regulations would conflict with the intent of
Congress in enacting sections 263 and 162, the regulations would be
improper under section 7805. 130
D.

Congress Is the Proper Actor

Although the IRS consists of experts on tax law, the agency's purpose is to interpret and administer the tax laws, not make them. 131
Enacting the proposed regulation, or a similar one, would be creating
a new law. 132 The IRS is attempting to make sense of the widespread
confusion that has followed INDOPCO by enacting this regulation.
However, the various and often conflicting judicial, as well as, IRS interpretations demand that Congress intervene and resolve the issue of
capitalization versus deduction.
One of the IRS' charges is to protect the interest of the public treasury.133 Another is to represent the best interest. of the government. 134 In compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act, the
IRS will submit the proposed regulation for public notice and comment. 135 Various taxpayers and taxpayer entities will make comments
regarding the regulations. However, because of widespread support
for the regulation, as seen by the comments sought by the proposed
regulation,136 the regulation may not necessarily result in the best law,
which is in the best interest of the government.
130. See Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. at 16; Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures, 67 Fed. Reg. 3461, 3462 (proposed Jan. 24,
2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1); see also I.R.C. §§ 7805, 263 (2002).
131. See David A. Brennen, Treasury Ref5Ulations and judicial Deference in the PostChevron Era, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 387, 388 (1997).
132. See George Hertz, IRS Agent Criticizes Proposed Guidance on Rules on Capitalizing Cost of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 29, 2002), available at
LEXIS, Taxation, Legal News, 2002 TNT 61-22; see also Samuel E. Whitley,
Writer Criticizes Proposed Guidance on Capitalizing Cost of Intangibles, TAX
NOTES TODAY (Mar. 29, 2002), available at LEXIS, Taxation, Legal News,
2002 TNT 61-24.
133. U.S. v. Hughes Properties, Inc. 476 U.S. 593, 603 (1986); Thor Power Tool
Co. v. Comm'r, 439 U.S. 522, 542 (1979).
134. Coverdale, supra note 112, at 71.
135. Administrative Procedure Act § 6, 5 U .S.C. § 553 (West 1994).
136. Deborah Aiken, ABA Tax Section Meeting: Accounting Guidance Gets Thumbs
Up, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 13, 2002), available at LEXIS, Taxation, Legal News, 2002 TNT 92-9; Mark R. Baran, Bankers Association Offers Suggestions For Rules on CaPitalizing Costs of Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr.
5, 2002), available at LEXIS, Taxation, Legal News, 2002 TNT 66-26; Catherine Barre & Keith Lawson, Investment Institute Suggests Changes to Capitalization Rules for Intangible Assets, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 2, 2002), available
atLEXIS, Taxation, Legal News, TNT 63-15; Pamela]. Pecarich, AICPA Suggests Changes to Proposed Regs on CaPitalizing Expenditures, TAX NOTES TODAY (May 17, 2002), available at LEXIS, Taxation, Legal News, 2002 TNT
66-26; Frederick H. Robinson, Attorney nxpresses Support for Capitalization
Rules for Intangible Assets, TAX NOTES TODAY (Apr. 2, 2002), available at
LEXIS, Taxation, Legal News, 2002 TNT 63-l4.
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Very few of the comments regarding the proposed regulations are
negative. 137 The fear is that the IRS will attempt to draft the regulation in a manner that is too favorable to the taxpayer and unfavorable
to the government. 13S In proposing such a regulation, the IRS is
abandoning its responsibilities in favor of appeasing taxpayers.
Once the regulation has survived the notice and comment procedure and is enacted, courts will generally grant the regulation Chevron
deference. 139 With this level of deference, the government's interest
becomes harder to protect. 140 If the IRS fails to protect the government's interest at the first level, the promulgation stage, then Congress cannot assume that the IRS will act in the government's best
interest when carrying out the regulations. 141 This failure requires
the courts to intercede. However, because of Chevron, most courts will
feel uncomfortable assuming this role. 142 With the IRS abandoning
its responsibilities and the courts unlikely to act, Congress will be
forced to enact legislation to correct the problem. Because it is likely
that Congress will have to respond to the issue at some time, it is better to have Congress respond sooner than later.
The IRS has been inconsistent in the interpretation of when something should be capitalized. 143 Will the proposed regulations resolve
the tendency to be inconsistent regarding capitalization? The regulations would only serve as guidelines for the IRS. Those guidelines will
still be subject to interpretation by IRS agents, attorneys and other
employees, because someone will have to determine if the item is regular and recurring. Unless a taxpayer's particular expenditure falls
within a stated exception to the norm of capitalization, the IRS and
the taxpayer may still disagree on whether or not the expenditure
should be capitalized. Outside the stated exceptions there still exists
the opportunity for taxpayers to face inconsistent interpretations. It
would be impossible for the IRS to draft regulations that would cover
every possible expenditure and determine if it should be deducted or
capitalized.
137. Hertz, supra note 132; see also Whitley, supra note 132.
138. Hertz, supra note 132; see also Whitley, supra note 132.
139. Bankers Life and Cas. Co. v. U.S., 142 F.3d 973, 980 (7th Cir. 1998); see
Aprill, supra note 108, at 63-64 and Coverdale, supra note 112, at 69-70 for a
discussion of Chevron deference.
140. With Chevron deference, the first step a court examining a regulation takes
is to determine if Congress has spoken on the issue on point. See Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984). If
not, then the court determines if the agency's interpretation is reasonable.
See id.

141. Apri II , supra note 108, at 64.
142. See U.s. v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1967) (stating that the judiciary's
role is to make sure that the Commissioner's regulations fall within his authority to implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable
manner).
143. U.S. Freightways, Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F.3d 1137, 1139 (7th Cir. 2001).
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IV.

PROBLEMS WITH A REGULAR AND RECURRING RULE

A.

The "One-Year Rule"

Part of the confusion surrounding the capitalization versus deduction issue involves a misunderstanding of what is commonly referred
to as the "one-year rule."144 The proposed regulations suggest a
twelve-month rule,145 which must be read in conjunction with the regular and recurring rule. Failure to do so, would suggest that a taxpayer could deduct a regular and recurring item even if the
expenditure created an asset that had a useful life of more than one
year. Such a reading would avoid section 263 and the norm of
capitalization. 146
The "one-year rule" arose out of the ninth circuit in Zaninovich v.
Commissioner. 14 7 In Zaninovich, a cash basis taxpayer prepaid 12
months of rent for farm property as required by the lease,148 which
was also the custom in the area farming industry.149 The taxpayer
sought to deduct the entire amount in the year paid, even though the
rent was mostly allocable to the next tax year. 150 The tax court declined to permit the deduction. 151 However, the ninth circuit permitted the deduction, stating: "[u]nder the ,'one-year rule' an
expenditure is treated as a capital expenditure if it creates an asset, or
secures a like advantage to the taxpayer, having a useful life in excess
of one year."152
The court distinguished between accrual method and cash method
taxpayers. I53 The court noted that a difference in deductions for the
two methods is that the accrual method requires deductions to be
matched to income, whereas the cash method does not have the same
requirement. 154 It emphasized that pro-ration is necessary for proper
matching of income to expenses. 155
The court then goes on to note that "the 'one-year rule' is strictly
applied to allow a full deduction in the year of payment."156 Zaninovich suggests that the court understood that the "one-year rule" did
144. Compare U.S. Freightways, Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 329, 337 (1999)
(holding that the "one-year rule" does not apply to accrual method taxpayers), with U.S. Freightways, Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F.3d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir.
2001) (extending the "one-year rule" to accrual method taxpayers).
145. Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures 67 Fed.
Reg. 3461, 3462 (proposed Jan. 24, 2002) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
146. See id.
147. 616 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1980).
148. [d. at 430.
149. [d. at 430 n.2.
150. [d. at 430.
151. Zaninovich v. Comm'r, 69 T.C. 605, 608 (1978).
152. Zaninovich, 616 F.2d at 432.
153. [d. at 431 n.5.
154. [d.
155. [d.
156. [d. at 432 n.6.
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not apply to accrual method taxpayers, because as a general rule, their
deductions are not tied to payment, like those of a cash method
taxpayer. 157
In addition to mistakenly applying the "one-year rule" to an accrual
method taxpayer, the seventh circuit in US. Freightways failed to acknowledge the additional requirements of the "one-year rule" that
were created by the tax court in Grynberg v. Commissioner. 15s The cash
method taxpayer in Grynberg attempted to deduct the prepayment of
expenses that would have been deductible under section 162 as trade
or business expenses. 159 The tax court stated that when a deduction
for a prepayment by a cash method taxpayer is considered under this
section, then three requirements must be met. 160
The first requirement is that the taxpayer must actually pay the expense. 161 The next requirement is that the taxpayer must have a "substantial business reason" for prepayment of the expense and that the
purpose for prepayment must be one other than to accelerate a deduction. 162 Finally, the last requirement mandates that the prepayment cannot cause a material distortion in the taxable income of the
taxpayer. 163
Arguably, these requirements are for cash method taxpayers, and
the court did not consider what requirements might apply to accrual
method taxpayers. This court's lack of consideration of the accrual
method taxpayers might suggest that the tax court did not contemplate application of the "one-year rule" to these taxpayers. Despite
the limitation of these requirements to cash method taxpayers, the
seventh circuit, when considering extending the "one-year rule" to accrual method taxpayers, should have examined the purpose and intent behind the additional requirements to ensure that taxpayers are
treated consistently. By ignoring these additional requirements, the
court created a loophole that accrual method taxpayers can use to
avoid matching income to expenses.
The proposed regulations also appear to disregard these additional
requirements. It is unclear from the regulations if cash method taxpayers would now be excused from meeting these requirements.

157. Zaninovich, 616 F.2d at 431-32 nn.5-6.
158. U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F.3d 1137, 1142-43 (7th Cir. 2001)
(citing Grynberg v. Comm'r, 83 T.C. 255 (1984)).
159. Grynberg, 83 T.C. at 265 n.10.
160. [d. at 265.
161. [d.
162. [d. at 266.
163. [d.
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Where Would the One-Year Rule Fit into the Internal Revenue Code?

Because regulations modify and interpret existing code sections,164
the regular and recurring regulation must fall under a particular code
section. The regulation will not be able to stand on its own. This
requirement necessitates that the authors of the regulation carefully
consider the tax scheme of the code and properly fit in the regulation.
The regulation'S author has two options for placement of the
regulation.
1.

Would This Regulation Modify Section 263?

The regulation could fall under the auspices of section 263, the
code section known as the capitalization section. In essence, the regulation would operate as an exception to the norm of capitalization.
However, section 263 is not a deduction statute. In fact, it is just the
opposite. Section 263 states: "[n]o deduction shall be allowed" and
then lists capital expenditures in which deductions are not allowed. 165
Consequently, section 263 cannot operate as authority for expressly
allowing a deduction; whereas in section 161, Congress specifically
enumerated deductions allowed by the Code. 166
Logic suggests that the IRS cannot use a non-deduction statute to
create a deduction. Therefore, despite coming under the auspices of
section 263, the regulation would need to be read together with another code section in order to create a deduction. The obvious
choice is section 162 -the trade or business expense section.
2.

Would This Regulation Modify Section 162?

Another way to interpret the regulation is that it substitutes a recurring element for the expense element. Under this interpretation, a
taxpayer who is determining whether an expenditure is deductible
under section 162 or must be capitalized under section 263, would be
able to deduct the amount in full if the expenditure is regular and
recurring in nature. It is unclear if a taxpayer would be required to
determine if the deduction resulted in better matching or caused a
material distortion in income. If this were the case, then there would
no longer be a need for different methods of accounting.
By adding this substitution to section 162, the IRS would be creating
an exception that is in direct conflict with the spoken intent of Congress. 167 Congress has spoken on the issue of recurring expenses with
section 461 (h)(3), the recurring item exception. 168
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See generally Brennen, supra note 131, at 388-89.
26 U.S.C.A. § 263(a) (West 2002).
See id.; see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 161 (West 2002).
See 26 U.S.C.A. § 461 (h) (3) (West 2002).
Id.
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C.

How Would The One-Year Rule Interact with Other Code Requirements?

1.

How Would This New Rule Interact with and Impact the Congressionally Created Recurring Item Exception of Section 461(h)(3)?

In 1984, Congress added an economic performance requirement to
the deduction of expenses for accrual method taxpayers. 169 This requirement was to take into account the time value of money and to
prevent accrual method taxpayers from accelerating deductions by
prepaying them. 170 In general, economic performance requires that
all the obligations tied to the expense be fulfilled. l7l For example, if
the taxpayer hires an employee, economic performance would occur
as that the employee provides services to the employer. 172
Congress recognized that the economic performance requirement
might hinder the normal operations of a business, so it created the
recurring item exception to economic performance. 173 This exception would allow a taxpayer to deduct an expense prior to economic
performance if economic performance would occur within a reasonable period after the close of the tax year, or eight and one-half months
after the close of the tax year. 174 Congress also created three other
requirements. 175
Additionally, the item must be recurring in nature. 176 It needs to
be an expense that the taxpayer regularly incurs in business. 177 Furthermore, the taxpayer must have consistently treated it as deductible
in the year that the all-events test is met. 178 This requires that the
taxpayer's treatment of the item for financial accounting as well as tax
accounting should correspond. Finally, the item needed to be immaterial or that immediate deduction would result in a better matching
of the expense to the income it generated. 179
Was this what the seventh circuit had in mind when it held in U.S.
Freightways that "ordinary, necessary, and recurring expenses for the
business" would be deductible?180 Freightways qualified for a recurring
169. 26 U.S.CA § 461(h) was added by Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-369, § 91(a), 1984 U.S.C.CAN. (98 Stat.) 494,598-601.
170. H.R. REp. No. 98-432 at 1254 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 697,
917.
171. For a detailed explanation of economic performance and the history of its
enactment, see Erik M. Jensen, The Deduction Of Future Liabilities By AccrualBasis Taxpayers: Premature Accruals, The All Events Test, And Economic Performance, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 443 (1985).

172. 26 U.S.CA § 461 (h) (2) (A)(i) (West 2002).
173. See H.R. CONF. REp. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 873, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.CAN. 1445, 1561.
174. 26 U.S.CA § 461(h)(3)(A)(ii) (West 2002).
175. [d. § 461 (h)(3)(A)(iii) & (iv).
176. [d. § 461 (h)(3)(A) (iii).
177. U.S. Freightways, Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F.3d 1137,1147 (7th Cir. 2001).
178. 26 U.S.CA § 461 (h)(3)(A) (iii) (West 2002).
179. [d. § 461(h)(3)(A)(iv).
180. US. Freightways, 270 F.3d at 1147.
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item exception because the expenses at issue were fixed yearly expenses. 18I That being the case, it would suggest that the recurring
nature the court was referring to was outside the scope of section
461 (h) (3). Additionally, tying the recurring nature with ordinary and
necessary it would appear that the court was adding a requirement to
section 162.
What is the effect of having a regular and recurring rule on the
recurring item exception that Congress created? Would the regulation replace the exception Congress created? If an item was recurring
under the regulation would it be presumed to be recurring for purposes of section 461 (h)(3)? Would a taxpayer no longer have to be
concerned with the materiality or the matching of expenses to income
if the item is recurring?
A regular and recurring regulation that grants a deduction is not
necessary, because Congress has already provided for it with section
461(h)(3).182 Any regulation that runs counter to section 461(h)(3)
would violate Congressional intent. Any regulation that replaces or
usurps the recurring item exception will be overreaching its bounds.
The regular and recurring regulation must take into account the intent of Congress in requiring a lack of materiality or better matching
for immediate deduction of recurring items.
2.

At What Point of Analysis Would a Taxpayer Input the New Regular and Recurring Rule?

Another issue that needs to be clarified regarding the regular and
recurring regulation is where it would fit in the analysis a taxpayer
completes for each expenditure in determining if that expenditure is
immediately deductible. Would the taxpayer first determine if section
162 applies, then determine if the item is recurring? If that is the
case, then the method of accounting the taxpayer uses would be immaterial. An accrual method taxpayer will be able to avoid the economic performance requirement by characterizing the item as
recurring.
If the regular and recurring regulation is taken into account under
the taxpayers' method of accounting, it will only be useful to accrual
method taxpayers. Cash method taxpayers do not need a regular and
recurring exception, because these taxpayers have the judicially created "one-year rule."183
So, would this regulation be used to treat accrual and cash method
taxpayers equally? Doing so would ignore the diverse purposes and
goals of the two different methods of accounting. The purpose of the
181. Id.
182. 26 U.S.C.A. § 461 (h)(3)(A)(iv) (West 2002).
183. See U.S. Freightways, 270 F.3d at 1140.
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cash metl).od of accounting is simplicity.184 The purpose of the accrual method of accounting is to match the expenses of a business
with the income that it produces. 185 There will be times when these
various purposes create inconsistencies for different taxpayers.
The placement of section 461 (h) (3) suggests that Congress recognizes the recurring item exception as a timing element and only relevant to accrual taxpayers. Therefore, Congress uses it as a substitute
for economic performance, but still requires a clear reflection of income or matching. Whereas a regular and recurring rule would do
away with this clear reflection of income requirement, which is inconsistent with Congress' spoken iritent.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is without question that taxpayers need guidance in determining
whether to capitalize or currently deduct an expenditure. However,
both the courts and the IRS have demonstrated a lack of consistency
and a misunderstanding of the issues. Therefore, it is necessary for
Congress to act to clarify the issues. It is only with a strong general
rule that both the courts and the IRS will be able to provide guidance
to taxpayers.
The current state of the law is in such a shamble that neither the
court nor the IRS can be expected to make cohesive, coherent guidelines. The IRS' efforts to provide the needed guidance, while laudable, are ill advised. This issue is one that requires the voice of
Congress.

184. Frank]. Slagle, Accountingfor Interest: An Analysis of Original Issue Discount in
the Sale of Property, 32 S.D. L. REv. 1, 13 (1987).
185. Joseph W. Blackburn, Fragmenting Cost Of Goods Sold For Accounting Accuracy
And Tax Profits, 31 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 295 (1987).

